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Origins and direction of the present debate
n the beginning there was skepticism. In a
speech on the limits of knowledge of nature given in
1872, the eminent physiologist and physician Emil du
Bois-Reymond demanded that mechanistic explanation
be considered the hallmark of scientific treatment of a
given subject matter. He then claimed that, alongside
free will, we do not know, and will never know—ignora-
mus et ignorabimus—how to explain consciousness in
physical terms: 
What conceivable connection is there between specific
movements of atoms in my brain on the one side, and the
for me primary, not further definable facts that ‘I feel pain,
feel lust; I taste something sweet, smell the scent of roses,
hear the tone of an organ, see red’….1
Note the examples used here: tastes, smells, sounds, and
colors as a subject perceives them. Current discourse
calls such phenomenal features of conscious states
“qualia,” a term we owe to Clarence Irving Lewis.2,3
Roughly, our perceptions and feelings have a qualitative
character to them—there is something it is like to be in
those states or, stated differently, they are phenomenally
conscious to the subjects who undergo these states.
Examples may help to understand what is meant by such
obviously not very lucid philosophical jargon. If I look
at the color of a pair of socks inside a gloomy shop, it
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This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning
the mind–body problem, which is being addressed at the
interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses
on phenomenal features of consciousness or “qualia,”
which are distinguished from various related issues. Then
follows a discussion of various influential skeptical argu-
ments that question the possibility of reductive explana-
tions of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments,
conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple real-
izability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the
arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not nec-
essarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only
option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual
and methodological reflection is required, alongside
ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogma-
tism and naivety. 
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may appear differently to me compared with how it
appears outside in bright daylight; if I am pricked by a
needle on different occasions, my experience feels a cer-
tain way to me, and it might also well vary with my mood
or attention. To use a more important example, one
might also think of the distinctive kind of anxiety or
depressive feeling a psychiatric patient suffers from
when faced with a situation that healthy people perhaps
find merely a bit worrying. However, regardless of such
variations, what is most important about the qualia of
feelings and perceptions is that they are distinctive to
these mental states: they would not be what they are if
they did not possess certain qualitative features.
Are qualia reducible to material states of the brain? This
is sometimes said to be “the”—the only, or the most dif-
ficult, or the “hard”—problem of consciousness.4
Skepticism has often been the default position, not only
among philosophers but among cognitive scientists as
well: 
Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenome-
non; it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does,
or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been
written about it.5
John Searle makes a different but related point: 
Until recently, most neuroscientists did not regard
consciousness as a suitable topic for scientific inves-
tigation. This reluctance was based on certain philo-
sophical mistakes, primarily the mistake of supposing
that the subjectivity of consciousness made it beyond
the reach of an objective science.6
Nowadays, in influential encyclopedia entries, one also
reads such musings as: “Questions about the nature of
conscious awareness have likely been asked for as long
as there have been humans.”7 This is probably not so;
and even if one “merely” claims that the topic of con-
sciousness has been around since ancient times, that is
misleading too. The problem of whether states of phe-
nomenal consciousness can be identified with appropri-
ate brain states cannot be found in Descartes or Kant.
Attempts to read it into those and other authors distort
their assumptions, arguments, and indeed their whole
agendas.8,9
For much of the 20th century, discussions about qualia
often arose from epistemological questions—How do
we know that a certain system has states of phenome-
nal qualia?—or from semantic problems—What is the
precise meaning of the relevant terms?10-12 U. T. Place,13
J. J. C. Smart,14 and others defended the idea that the
mind is simply the brain, with new arguments. Their
“reductive physicalism” was in turn attacked, especially
in influential papers by Thomas Nagel,15 Frank
Jackson,16,17 and Joseph Levine.18 Du Bois-Reymond’s
skepticism was revived in various ways, provoking a
flood of consciousness studies over recent years.4,6,7,19-28
The relation between qualia and brain states is now pri-
marily discussed from ontological and explanatory per-
spectives: are states of phenomenal consciousness and
brain states two or one? Can we reductively explain
qualia in neuroscientific terms? That is, in a first approx-
imation, can we state neuroscientific laws that explain
why a system is (and also why it is not) in a certain state
of phenomenal consciousness, similar perhaps to the
physical explanations for why a system is solid, liquid,
or gaseous, or why it possesses the (objective) color or
temperature that it possesses? Epistemology (including
scientific methodology) and semantics clearly cannot be
ignored in such debates; however, much current work in
cognitive neuroscience and philosophy aims at clarify-
ing whether a reductive explanation or identification of
phenomenal and brain states can be achieved, and if so,
how. 
Conceptual preliminaries
What reasons ground the philosophical doubts? Are
they plausible? Three preliminary remarks need to be
made before any serious discussion can start.
Consciousness and mind
One should not identify thinking about the nature of
consciousness with thinking about the nature of the
mind in general. Consciousness is but one aspect of the
mind, so the problem of consciousness is not identical to
what is often called “the mind-body problem.” There are
other philosophical problems regarding the mind. For
instance, the problem of intentionality: How can it be that
certain mental states (beliefs and desires, say) refer to
entities or states of affairs that are external to them-
selves? Or the problem of rationality: How can it be that
certain mental states are not merely causally related to
other events, but can also be right or wrong, good or bad,
reasonable or unreasonable? These and other issues
regarding mental states need not involve consciousness;
at least, it is not trivial to assume that they do and would
require argument. 
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Meanings of “consciousness”
The term “consciousness” has different meanings (as do
its cognates in other languages—French conscience,
German Bewusstsein, and so on). We speak of people
being conscious when they are generally aware or open
to sensory stimulation, as opposed to being asleep, anes-
thetized, or in a coma. This basic consciousness is a pre-
condition, but not identical to, phenomenal conscious-
ness; the different feelings of pleasure and pain, or the
sensations of various kinds hinted at in du Bois-
Reymond’s statement. The distinction is important.
Flohr maintains that anesthesia studies may well point
to a physical explanation of consciousness, and argues
more specifically for the role of N-methyl-D-aspartate
(NMDA) synaptic activity as a necessary and sufficient
condition for the presence of consciousness.29,30 However,
what explains our being aware at all need not be what
explains specific qualitative features of consciousness.
Among those who have produced alternative neurosci-
entific accounts of basic awareness, Crick and Koch31
have carefully avoided conflating it with phenomenal
consciousness. Theories that connect the two aspects of
consciousness, eg, through notions of information and its
integration, also respect the difference.32
Next, there is “access-consciousness”33 of what one
thinks, believes, or desires. We can verbally report these
states, reflect on them and reason about them, and, to
some extent, even control them. Such consciousness
need not possess any phenomenal features. I may be
conscious of my believing that F=ma, or of my decision
to buy one sort of toilet paper rather than another, but
that consciousness does not require any qualitative fea-
tures. Beliefs and decisions can perhaps be experienced
in certain ways, but if they have qualitative features at
all, these are not essential to them. 
Furthermore, there is the questionable idea that con-
sciousness and self-consciousness are the same. Mirror
experiments show that great apes, elephants, and even
bird species such as keas and European magpies can
react purposefully to spots on their own bodies, and thus
reveal a kind of self-recognition.34 Many animals do not
pass the test, but we would not say that they are uncon-
scious or that their sensations or feelings are devoid of
qualitative features. These and other possible meanings
of the term “consciousness”22,24 must be separated if one
does not want to confuse what one aims to explain, or
what one’s neuroscientific data are about.
Problems of consciousness
There is not merely one philosophical problem that calls
into doubt the possibility of a scientific treatment of con-
sciousness. First, all problems depend on what we mean by
“material states” —a question about which there is little
clarity. The concept of matter has changed through history
and will probably continue to do so.35 It is also controver-
sial what constitutes a reductive explanation of phenome-
nological generalizations—about temperatures of gases,
say—to microphysical laws—in this case, the kinetic theory
of heat.36 Furthermore, with respect to all the aforemen-
tioned kinds of consciousness, we can ask whether they are
reducible to brain states or processes. Even when we focus
on only one kind of consciousness, there are further dis-
tinctions to be made. For instance, it is one thing to ask (i)
whether brain states are identical to qualia; and another (ii)
whether it is possible to explain qualia in physicalist terms.
We will see the importance of this distinction below. 
A short guide through major 
philosophical debates
In what follows, the focus is on phenomenal conscious-
ness alone, although some of the following considera-
tions can be recast for other aspects of the mind. I pre-
sent a number of influential skeptical arguments
concerning reductive physicalism about qualia in an
order from less to more plausible, each followed by the
most straightforward and plausible replies (often some-
what simplified). Sometimes, I also mention counter-
replies, thereby indicating that the critic of the skeptical
argument needs to do better, by giving another reply or
by addressing further skeptical arguments as well. 
Knowledge argument 1
Neuroscience has not yet helped us to understand the
nature of phenomenal consciousness. “How can technicolor
phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter?”25 It is at
least an open question as to whether physicalism is correct.
Reply 1
This is a weak appeal to ignorance. In the past, we did not
understand the nature of combustion or electrical phe-
nomena, and had mistaken views about many things
from planetary motions to the composition of matter.
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Science does better now. Perhaps future neuroscience
will similarly come to discover relevant laws and thus
help us to explain how colors look the way they do to us
or why our modes of smelling or experiencing pleasure
are the way they are.37
Counterreply 
Science has also discovered that some problems are in
principle unsolvable. For instance, mathematicians spent
several hundred years trying to solve polynomial equa-
tions of a degree ≥5 before it became clear that there
cannot be any general solution for such equations.
Betting on the future of science is no compelling argu-
ment either.38
Reply 2
True, the matter is an open issue; but nothing more than
that.
Knowledge argument 2
A more radical version: assume physicalism is true, and
neuroscientists have discovered all the relevant laws
about the structure and functioning of the brain. Now
imagine a neuroscientist who possesses this knowledge
but lacks color perception from birth. It seems that the
scientist’s knowledge would leave out something impor-
tant: he would not know, for example, what a red object
looks like. He would learn something new if he came to
acquire color sensation. Hence, physicalist explanations
do not cover all the truths that there are.16,17
Reply
Here is one way in which this fictive situation may be
obtained while physicalism is true. Perhaps we are look-
ing at the same thing from different angles. When we give
a physicalist explanation of seeing a rose, we do so in
terms that are objective or given from a third-person
point of view, but this does not mean that we are not
thereby getting at exactly the same event or property
when considered from a subjective or first-person point
of view.37,39 To use an analogy: do you know who Farrokh
Pluto Bulsara was? Well, he was the same person as the
singer Freddy Mercury. If you did not know, it does not
matter: it does not follow from your ignorance that
Farrokh Pluto Bulsara was not Freddy Mercury.
Likewise, Bruce Wayne is the same (fictional) character
as Batman, but within the comic series only a select few
know this. However, in principle any character could
come to know it if they only followed Bruce Wayne’s
movements through space-time consistently until the
moment when he pulls his black underpants over his gray
costume. Sometimes, new knowledge is about the same
objects and facts that you already knew in a different
way.40 It is certainly arduous to figure out which brain
states are identical to which phenomenal states; it
requires extensive correlational and experimental work.
But we cannot infer from such difficulties that phenom-
enal states and brain states are not identical.
Conceivability arguments
These arguments raise the bar for the reductive physi-
calist by combining doctrines of modal logic with further
thought experiments. First, it is a valid principle of modal
logic that if identity statements using so-called “rigid des-
ignators” a and b are true (a = b, as in Farrokh Pluto
Bulsara = Freddy Mercury) then they are also necessar-
ily true. It follows by strict logical conversion that in cases
in which it is not necessary that a and b are identical, then
a and b must be distinct; and if that is so, it simply means
that if it is possible that a and b are distinct (or describe
distinct entities), then they actually are distinct.41 Note:
This claim holds for identity statements using names or
also “natural kind” terms —terms that pick out classes of
things that share some sort of natural essence. For
instance: water = H2O. Now, we can conceive of or imag-
ine systems that are physically and functionally com-
pletely identical to us, but that: (i) have radically differ-
ent phenomenal states (perhaps their spectrum of tastes
is entirely switched, analogous to color spectrum inver-
sions imagined since John Locke) or (ii) do not have any
phenomenal states at all. Such creatures might be able to
respond to the question of what a Cuba libre tastes like,
but without ever perceiving its mild and cool bitterness.
If that is possible, then—due to the principles of modal
logic mentioned before—qualia cannot be identical to
brain states.42
Reply
Conceivability does not imply possibility. The modal log-
ical principles mentioned are only about actual possibil-
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ity, not about conceivability or imaginability used in such
a thought experiment. Thought experiments of the “zom-
bie” kind will not suffice to show that phenomenal states
cannot be brain states.43,44 Another point that might be
questioned is the assumption that terms for qualia are
natural kind terms, but that requires more laborious
semantic discussions. 
The argument from multiple realizability
Even if conceivability arguments are not convincing,
there is a similar problem for reductive physicalism about
the mind in general, which must affect physicalism about
qualia. It has been argued that perhaps types of mental
states can be realized in different physical systems.45,46
Again, an analogy helps: this text can be printed on
paper, be presented on a computer screen, or read aloud.
So, the text can be realized in different physical ways and
still remain the same (type of) text. Why should the brain
be the only way mental states can be realized?
Furthermore, computer programs can realize the same
logical inference steps that humans sometimes perform
in their thinking. Indeed, when Herbert Simon and Allen
Newell were working on their first computer program,
called Logic Theorist, they tested it by using human com-
ponents; namely, Simon’s wife, children and several grad-
uate students.47 Similarly, would it not reveal “chauvin-
ism” about the brain to assume that only brain states can
realize phenomenal states?48
Reply 1
Typically, this argument has been used to show that it
may be unrealistic to demand that types of mental states
can be reductively explained in physical terms. However,
tokens of such states (the specific instances of them, such
as my seeing pink at a certain specifiable time and place)
may nevertheless have to be realized by (tokens of) phys-
ical states. After all, how could mental states be causally
related to physical states if such a moderate physicalism
was not true?49
Counterreply
That is no longer a reductive kind of physicalism; we
could no longer expect neuroscience to provide us with
explanations of why types of phenomenal qualia are the
way they are.
Reply 2
At least two points suggest compatibility between multi-
ple realizability and reductive physicalism about qualia.
First, perhaps we can group together certain brain states
into neurophysiological types without requiring that
these types share all their microphysical properties. These
neurophysiological types might then be identical to types
of phenomenal consciousness while allowing for multi-
ple realization at the microphysical level.50 Second, tem-
perature is also a property that is multiply realized: in the
Earth’s atmosphere, in the atmospheres of other planets,
and so on. Does it follow that we cannot reductively
explain temperature in physicalist terms? No: the tem-
perature of a gas is always the mean molecular energy of
its constituent molecules, and their behavior follows strict
physical laws. Similar examples can be given from other
areas. Multiple realizability therefore does not under-
mine the possibility of reducing types to types.51
The explanatory gap
Let us grant that we know the laws governing the motions
of molecules and the initial conditions of a given physical
system; so we can explain why it is, for instance, gaseous,
liquid, or solid, or why it behaves the way it does in other
respects. That is, let us grant that there are correct reduc-
tive explanations of phenomenological regularities in
terms of microphysical laws and ignore the—actually
complicated— debate surrounding this assumption.36,52
Now, assume that we were in the situation of knowing all
the laws governing neural processes. Assume also that it
is possible to describe precisely a situation where my nose
is located above a glass of Cuba libre, and everything is
working well. Could we then derive how the drink smells
to a being like me from the laws and initial conditions? It
does not seem as if one would thereby grasp why the state
has the phenomenal features it does. To use a different
example, sharks, like other fish, possess a sensory organ
called “lateral line” that detects movement and vibrations
in the surrounding water, and perhaps even magnetic
fields. If we knew the structure and mechanism of this
organ, we would still not have an explanation of how
sharks experience movement and vibrations. We may
understand the brain activities of bats navigating by
means of ultrasonic echolocation pretty well, but we will
be at a loss when asked what it is like to navigate this
way.46 This is an “explanatory gap.” 18,23
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A deeper way of presenting this argument is as follows.
According to a widely accepted conception of reductive
explanation, any such explanation must start from an
analysis of the functional properties that one wishes to
explain reductively—the properties that are relevant for
the causal relations of the objects or states. One can then
look for the microphysical properties that can be used to
explain the behavior of the system on a macrolevel. For
instance, assume we wish to explain that water dissolves
salt. We start by analyzing water as the odorless, drinkable,
colorless liquid in lakes and rivers, thus fixing the refer-
ence of “water.” Next, we (i) can cite experiments show-
ing that H2O dissolves salt; (ii) explain – on the basis of
microphysical properties of H2O and salt—why this is so;
and (iii) identify H2O as the odorless, drinkable liquid etc.
From our prior analysis of water as the odorless, drinkable
liquid etc, and (i)-(iii), we can explain why water dissolves
salt.40 Unfortunately, so the argument continues, qualia do
not allow for any functional analysis. Rather, we charac-
terize them by their qualitative features alone.41
Note that the explanatory gap argument is not about
ontology but epistemology. It does not support the con-
clusion that qualia are not brain states after all. However,
it is also not good news for the physicalist, since it reveals
that it is unclear what purported neuroscientific “expla-
nations” of phenomenal states really show.
Reply 1
It is a mistake to assume that there is an explanatory
gap. If Farrokh Pluto Bulsara really was Freddy Mercury,
there is nothing to be explained reductively about this
fact: he just was who he was. If this reply is not convinc-
ing in the case of the identity of qualia and brain states,
this is because of an “antipathetic fallacy”: when pre-
sented with an identity claim about a certain feeling, we
do not see that feeling represented in the reduced parts
of the identity claim, and therefore infer that something
is left out.53 Likewise, if we are given a reductive expla-
nation of the shark’s experience of vibrations in the sur-
rounding water in terms of receptors and hair cells, we
do not think that this leaves something out, even though
we do not feel things the way the shark does.
Counterreply
This argument misses the point of the claim about an
explanatory gap. To pick up the distinction introduced at
the end of Section 2, it addresses the issue of (i) whether
brain states are identical to qualia; but not (ii) whether
it is possible to explain qualia in reductive physicalist
terms. The point of the explanatory gap argument is that
it is unclear why material states of the brain feel a cer-
tain way to a subject, and perhaps even why they feel
any way at all.38
Reply 2
A different way of bridging the explanatory gap, and of
addressing (ii), is to attack the assumption that phe-
nomenal states do not allow for any functional analy-
sis.54,55 At least in some areas, our everyday understand-
ing of qualia is different. For instance, it is very unlikely
that negative emotions such as fear, sadness, or anger
can just switch places with more positive ones.56 Also,
think of auditory qualia. If full spectrum inversion con-
cerning loudness or pitch was possible, then complete
silence would appear as extreme noise and vice versa, or
very high tones as very low ones, and so on. It is implau-
sible that such changes would have no causal effects.
With very low tones, we do not only hear them, we also
sense their vibrations through our bodies. Moreover,
consider the autobiographical account given by the
color-blind perceptual researcher Kurt Nordby, who suf-
fers from achromatopsy, the condition of seeing only in
black and white, and shades of grey. He sees things as
very blurred and is highly sensitive to light. The more
intense the light, the more Nordby has to blink; he
moves around extremely carefully, and so on.57 Colors
convey important contrasts, thus enhancing vision.
New developments and tasks
What is the difference between philosophers and
Rottweilers? Rottweilers eventually let go. There are
almost infinite ways to continue the philosophical argu-
ments outlined above. While the weight of the preceding
considerations is in favor of reductive physicalism, we
can expect no knock-down proof. For instance, there are
discussions about whether the attempts to bridge the
explanatory gap by means of functional analysis of con-
cepts of qualia do not again miss the point: it would still
be unclear how an Alzheimer patient experiences emo-
tions or how claustrophobic people experience fear.38 In
my view, such considerations tend to conflate the notion
of scientific explanation with the notion of empathetic
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understanding. Explanatory knowledge should provide
the conditions under which a phenomenon occurs or
does not occur. Such knowledge need not also provide
those who possess it with an awareness or understand-
ing of how things feel from the point of view of a differ-
ent sentient creature. 
A related question currently under discussion is whether
the concept of qualia is clear enough. Those who assume
an explanatory gap often claim that qualia are “intrin-
sic” properties (not relational: not dependent upon other
things), and subjective and ineffable (ie, their content
cannot be expressed in words, at least not completely).
Saying they are intrinsic, however, might beg the ques-
tion, since it excludes the possibility of functional analy-
sis. So reductionists favor a more moderate notion of
qualia, which merely focuses on the phenomenal char-
acter (the “what-it’s-likeness”) as the explanandum.58,59
Some would even eliminate talk of qualia entirely.60 This
debate is wholly open.
So, if I had to place my bets now, reductive physicalism
would be where I would put my money. It is at least a
working hypothesis that motivates further research more
than the less ambitious search for correlations only.
Accordingly, research has developed along the lines of
looking more closely into specific areas for such explana-
tory reduction. One very positive development is that
neuroscientists and philosophers often collaborate to
study not only of vision and pain but also a wide spec-
trum of emotions,61 auditory sensation, olfaction,62 and
other topics as well. 
Two final warning signs need to be heeded, however,
concerning the two basic kinds of observation in this
area: brain activity measurements using certain instru-
ments, and subjects’ reports about their qualia. First,
there is a worry that studies based on fMRI produce cor-
relations between brain activity measurements and men-
tal state characteristics (such as anxiety, empathy, or dis-
tress) that are much higher than to be expected.63
Second, any research into the neuroscience of phenom-
enal consciousness has to deal with serious problems of
first-person reports. Whether there can be a science of
consciousness depends on the old question of whether
introspection is a legitimate and reliable method. These
problems are serious. While being methodological in
nature, one might properly describe them not as traps or
gaps, but as breathtaking abysses instead. There are
extensive debates about them in philosophy and cogni-
tive psychology that neuroscientists need to take
onboard.42,59,64-69
Conclusion: the limits of skepticism
What is interesting is that much neuroscience of the
mind has been provoked by skeptical philosophical
arguments. However, as Immanuel Kant said, skeptics
are like nomads, who abhor “permanent cultivation of
the soil.” The chief function of skepticism is to sharpen
our reasoning, and to avoid both dogmatism and naivety.
Naivety here consists of an inference from statements
about empirical correlations between brain states and
qualia to claims that the former reductively explain the
latter. Dogmatism would be to assume that reductive
physicalism must be true and defended, come what may.
Skepticism is no position to ultimately hold either; it is
not ultimately tenable or desirable. I have shown how
many skeptical arguments suffer from serious weak-
nesses. In my view, we should view the advancement of
the neuroscience of the mind as an arduous task that
perhaps requires, as previous developments in science
did, revisions of basic concepts and methodologies. ❏
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¿Conciencia recuperada? Argumentos 
filosóficos a favor y en contra del fisicalismo
reduccionista
Este artículo  presenta una visión panorámica de las
discusiones recientes en relación con el problema
mente-cuerpo, que se encuentran en una área de
intersección entre filosofía y neurociencia. Trata de
las características fenoménicas de la conciencia o
"qualia", que se diferencian de varios otros temas
relacionados. Sigue una discusión de los diversos
argumentos escépticos, pero influyentes, que cues-
tionan la posibilidad de explicaciones reduccionistas
de qualia en términos fisicalistas: argumentos de
conocimiento, argumentos sobre lo concebible, el
argumento de la realizabilidad múltiple, y el argu-
mento del hueco explicativo. Ninguno de los argu-
mentos resulta muy convincente. Se deduce que el
fisicalismo reduccionista, aunque resulta una posi-
ción defendible, no es necesariamente la única
opción. Para mantener tal punto de vista libre de
dogmatismo e ingenuidad, es necesario que una
constante reflexión conceptual y metodológica
acompañe las investigaciones en marcha.
Regain de conscience ? Arguments 
philosophiques pour et contre un 
physicalisme réducteur
Cet article est une revue des débats récents concer-
nant la dichotomie corps-esprit, qui se trouve à l’in-
tersection de la philosophie et de la neuroscience.
Il s’intéresse aux caractéristiques phénoménolo-
giques, de la conscience ou « qualia », mise en
exergue par rapport à d'autres sujets. S’ensuit une
analyse des différents arguments sceptiques
influents qui évoquent la possibilité d'explications
réductrices des qualia en des termes physicalistes :
arguments de connaissance, arguments de conce-
vabilité, l’argument d’une faisabilité multiple et
l’argument d'un fossé explicatif. Aucun de ces argu-
ments n’est très convaincant. Ces arguments ne
signifientt pas que le physicalisme réducteur est le
seul choix, mais il apparaîtdéfendable. Cependant,
il est nécessaire de conserver une réflexion métho-
dologique et conceptuelle constante, en accord
avec la recherche actuelle, afin de se garder à la fois
du dogmatisme et de la naïveté.
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